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Abstract:
The recent development in the organic agriculture space in China has been interesting
from a business perspective. While China is traditionally a strong producer of organic
products, most of the output are exported. However, domestic demand has increased
significantly in the past decade, which brought about a growing market. The
expansion of this market will not only benefit the companies involved, but also the
consumers as food safety issues continue to build up in China. In this paper, we first
provide an overview of the history and discuss the state of the related markets, and
then present a summary of a field trip we conducted in June 2014, and finally point to
areas that deserve further investigations.
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Introduction
The recent growth of domestic demand for organic food spurred widespread interest
in media and entrepreneurial communities, who are usually the first ones attending to
any emerging trends. However, there has not been much energy devoted into this area
from academia, and a summary of available studies would be valuable to people who
need to use the result either in further researches or in their own ventures.
In addition to theoretical analysis that focuses on big pictures and aggregate numbers,
field trip often brings insights from a different angle. A field trip in some of the
important organic food markets in China has been conducted, and a summary of
findings can be useful to people interested in this area.
This paper looks at the development of organic food market and some related markets
in China from both angles. A brief review of the recent development of the market is
presented first, followed by a summary of the field trip conducted in June and July of
2014. In the end, some potential areas deserving further investigation are suggested.

Review of the Recent Development
One year ago, when we were talking about recent trends in China, one common
observation was people's rising concern for food safety. For example, the baby milk
powder scandal of Sanlu Group and many other biggest dairy companies seriously
hurt consumer confidence in domestic dairy products; the issue with McDonald’s
meat supply from OSI Group and other media exposures cast shadow even on the
more established food providers. Things like man-made eggs or pork filled with water
is no news to any Chinese person who is concerned about food safety, and the
exacerbating pollution adds more weight to this problem.
Following incidents like Sanlu Group’s and OSI Group's scandals among many others,
people began to lose faith in any domestic food brand or even "traditional" food in
general. On the other hand, as a natural substitute and safer alternative, the market of
organic food began to be favored by consumers. Using Beijing residents as a sample,
researchers found that those who are aware of organic options are willing to pay a 5-6%
premium (Wang et. al, 2009, and Wang et. al, 2008), which, in contrast to the lack of
premium previously, indicates that demand for food safety is emerging as food safety
becomes a product attribute valued by Chinese consumers.
Another factor that might have contributed to the rapid increase of domestic demand
for organic food is the increase in disposable incomes. According to the National
Bureau of Statistics of China, the disposable income per capita of Chinese citizens
grew from around 5,000 Yuan to around 28,000 Yuan since 2001. This gives
households many more options in their diet selection, and might have contributed to
the rise of demand for more expensive but healthier food products.
On the supply side, the growth occurred even earlier. From 2000 to 2006, China
boosted its position from 45th to second in the world in terms of hectares of land under
organic management, and accounted for 63% of the increase in world’s organic land
in 2005/2006 alone. (Paull 2008). The graph below from Paull (2008) illustrates the
rapid growth.

However, a large portion of the organic production was exported, and those sold
domestically were sold without an organic price premium prior to 2006 (Kledal et. al,
2007). Therefore the primary driver for farmers had always been trade and export,
until the recent change happens.
While both demand and supply went up, the supply chain that links producers and
consumers is not sufficiently developed. Only recently did some of the pioneers begin
to enter the market to better coordinate the supply chain. For example, E-commerce
companies such as Yihaodian (partially owned by Walmart) and JD.com both
invested heavily in this area. JD.com announced investment in this area as one of the
major use of fund from its IPO. Delivery companies like SF also launched its own
platform of fresh food delivery.
Our hypothesis is the following: traditionally (since before 2006), China has been a
large producer of organic products, with trade and export being the primary motivator
of farmer behaviors. Recently, domestic demand shot up due to food safety issues and
increase in willingness to pay for organic premiums. Yet to be seen is the
establishment of a supply chain system that sells domestic products to local
consumers, and this area is where business opportunities are most concentrated.

The field trip
The field trip surveyed some fastest growing regional markets for organic food,
mainly Beijing and Shanghai. We visited and interviewed people and organizations
involved in different positions within the industry value chain, such as organic farm
owners and managements, farmers, distributors, as well as startups and NGOs within
this space. Below is the summary of takeaways from the field trip. Some numbers
about costs and prices are found in conversations as well as observations, but they are
not sufficiently systematic for us to build any valid model. However, we were able to
identify some challenges as well as opportunities for the industry from the interviews
and observations.
Challenges
First of all, on the demand side, we found that public awareness of organic standards
is very low even in economically advanced cities like Beijing, and the effort to
educate people is severely lacking. As researches of Wang et. al, (2009), and Wang et.
al, (2008) indicate, the awareness of specific requirements for “organic certificate” is
one of most prominent factors in creating the premium for organic product, and such a
lack of awareness would greatly hinder the growth of demand for it. Most organic
brands sold in Itoyakado, a regional premium supermarket in Beijing, have no
indication of “organic practice” other than the certificate logo on their product
packages. Apparently, educating the customers about the advantages of organic food

would bring about real demand growth for the product, but the challenge lies in the
implementation – who is the one to spend the time and energy to do it?
Second, on the supply side, we were surprised by the length of the investment and
production cycle of organic agriculture. From the interview with the General Manager
of DuoLi Farm, the largest fully vertically integrated organic farm in China, we
learned that the time period for an average piece ofland to be converted to arable land
that conforms to organic standards is at least three years. It takes some additional
years to be producing at full capacity. Some unlucky people might even spend years
getting their products “certified” as organic as a result of the complex land and soil
regulations. This means any newly converted organic farm will see more than five
years of cash outflow at the beginning, which simply shuts the door for small
companies without a deep pocket, as they cannot survive the long period of cash
outflows. As confirmed by our interview with investing professionals, capitals are
more available to less risky businesses such as quality agricultural chemical producers.
DuoLi was able to afford such investments because it gained governmental support
with the credentials of its founder, a long-time expert in this industry. However, the
General Manager still refused to comment on the profitability of DuoLi.
Moreover, the ability of farmers to navigate the new technology as well as changing
governmental regulations add to the barrier, and there is not enough support available.
During the meeting at China Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement (CFOAM),
a non-profit that helps to drive business development in the Chinese organic market,
two kinds of questions were raised most frequently by participants – how to use the
internet and mobile platform to promote their products, and how to get through the
organic certification process. Some of them do not have the time to research into these
topics, other simply do not have the level of education to do so. Most participants are
interested in converting into organic, but few were able to do so.
Finally, there are challenges to the middle part of the industry chain – the distribution
channels. During the Wharton Summit in Beijing, we met with Gang Yu, the CEO of
Yihaodian, one of the major E-commerce stores in China. Interestingly, when asked
about his opinion on door-to-door delivery service of organic products, he posed only
one question: “How much money are you ready to burn?” As he introduced to us,
competition is increasingly fierce in the space of fresh food delivery service, and large
amounts of funding are required to establish the distribution channel in order to
compete in this area. Hence, it is difficult for startup players to enter this space, since
they tend to have only limited funding, while supply chain network is an economy of
scale. This is confirmed by recent evidence, as all the newly entrants are backed up by
huge corporations, such as SF, Tencent, Alibaba, and so on.
Insights and opportunities

First of all, we should focus on promoting public awareness of organic standards.
Increased awareness of organic practices will increase customers’ willingness to pay,
raise the premium that producers can charge, and thus lead to faster market growth
rate. While we recognize that education is hard, it would provide large benefit to both
producers and consumers. Government agencies are in the best position to provide
such kind of education, as it is a common good that will be enjoyed by the society.
There needs to be a more transparent and official public platform for people to learn
and get familiar with the national organic standards. They need to provide a clearer
scientific explanation for the derivation of these standards and educate the masses on
the perks of organic consumption. Furthermore, those companies competing in the
sector of organic food should also be interested in educating their customers, as this
will likely result in broadened profit margin.
Second, we should look for ways that can best help players in the market to develop
their businesses. Currently, the support for small farmers and small businesses are
very little, as we learned from the meeting at CFOAM. NGOs such as CFOAM are
mostly in the very primitive stage. Many farmers are interested in converting to
organic production, and many dealers are interested in utilizing the online and mobile
platform, but few can find sufficient support to actually implement. We recommend
further investigation into how we can most efficiently provide support for these
people.
Third, as we learned from the interview with a graduate student Tsinghua whose
researches focus on organic certification, further development of food safety practices
should be encouraged to focus on Traceability. Traceability means for every package
of product, we should be able to identify all parties involved in its production, from
raw material supplier to retailer. This is a very crucial because traceability deters
unscrupulous behavior from irresponsible players in the market. Traceability
technologies can help governmental agencies to hold companies responsible when
their products do not meet their stated standards. In addition, this greatly increases the
level of trust that consumers have on these products. Again, increased trust leads to
higher willingness to pay, which leads to higher profit margin, higher production, and
finally expansion of the market.
Finally, interviews with HaSi Farm and DuoLi Farm helped us identify an
increasingly popular business model in this space – HaSi is a local player in urban
Beijng while DuoLi is a regional player in Shanghai area. This model involves
operating the entire supply chain from top to bottom. In this model, the business
conducts research, executes farming, packaging and delivery activities and provides
end-to-end customer service all on its own. The main target customer group is
typically the upper-middle income population who values healthy living. The business
grows over time to serve an increasing amount of living communities – communities
created by real estate developers. Fresh produce will be delivered door-to-door to
households in each community on a subscription basis. To reach customers,

word-of-mouth and social marketing through WeChat will be the main marketing
tactics. As the business grows, the main challenge shifts from marketing and farming
technologies (in the case of HaSi) to supply chain management (in the case of DuoLi).
This model partially solves the problem of traceability by simply integrating the entire
chain of production. This practice increased accountability by holding the business
accountable for anything that might arise from its product. They were thus able to
gain higher level of control over the quality of their product, and charge higher
premium for the “safety guarantee” that comes with it.
The itinerary and details for our field trip can be found in Appendix I.

Conclusions
In this paper, we provided a rough outline of the current product market through two
different angles – a review of the history of the market through some events and
existing literatures, and a field trip to the most developed regional organic markets in
China – Beijing and Shanghai.
Our analysis brings insights into the development of this market. Production has been
high and demand is catching up domestically, and what remains to be developed is the
distribution channel. We have seen increasingly fierce competition in this space as the
big players with deep pockets, such as Alibaba and Tencent, enter the market and
compete for market share. At the same time, the environment is somewhat hostile
toward small players who lack the ability to either establish delivery networks or to
sustain the first few years of cash outflow on the production side.
We identified several main barriers to the rapid development of the market: low
public awareness of organic practices, insufficient support for small businesses, and
long cycle of investments. We also proposed responses to the challenges: government
agencies should carry the responsibility of raising public awareness, future regulation
of organic product should focus on traceability, and NGOs should be encouraged in
order to provide sufficient support for small business development.
Due to the small scope of our research, there is a gap between our theoretical review
and our field trip research. The review is mostly on the aggregate level whereas the
field trip summary focuses on detailed observations. Thus we propose the following
questions for future researchers to answer: how would the competition of giant
players in the market impact the strategies of the small ones? How should government
modify regulations to both encourage entrepreneurship and be fair to giant players?
And finally, what is optimal level of organic production?
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Appendix I: Field trip details
Beijing
We arrived in Beijing at about 11PM on June 6 and found our way to a small hotel
close to the fifth ring of Beijing which gives us more convenient access to places we
wanted to visit over next few days. Before going to bed, we sorted a bunch of
business cards we have gathered from our network in China (most of them coming
from an agricultural conference a couple of month ago) and decided to reach out to a
few realistic organizations/companies for potential market research/interview.
Afterwhich, we spent about 30 mins figuring out the agenda for the next day’s visit to
ItoYokado Beijing - a Japanese-branded supermarket that sells organic produce.
An introduction to Itoyakado can be found here:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ito-Yokado.

June 7 - Distributor: Itoyakado 华堂超市

We arrived early at ItoYokado so as to avoid the midday crowd. Because we were not
able to secure an appointment with the branch manager beforehand, we wanted to see
if we could speak with him for about an hour or so during his lunch time. As Xinpeng
stepped aside to reach out to the cashier for his manager, the two of us closely
examined the organic produce section and specifically wanted to find out a little more
about where these organic produce came from and who the supplier was. While most
of them did not have any supplier information on that other than the ‘Certified To Be
Organic’ tag, a few of them such as lettuce and tomatoes did have supplier
information. Most of them come from the places within 100KM of Beijing. We took

out our phone cameras and wanted take pictures of these supplier tags. However,
some retail staff reacted immediately and sternly questioned our intention. They have
a policy of disallowing photos on premise. On hindsight, we thought of two reasons: 1)
they had somewhat exclusive and limited supply of these organic produce and fear
competitors sourcing from the same producers; 2) their organic produce was probably
not fully certified to be organic.
Takeaway: Public awareness of organic practices is low, and education would be a
hard job to do.
At the end of things, we were not able to reach out to the manager to conduct a
thorough research but did speak with retail staff to understand a little about their
supply chain operations. They had sourcing managers who would source for these
organic produce on a daily basis pending availability of each selection. Then these
organic produce was delivered by truck in the wee hours from outside of Beijing to
the supermarket directly using their leased/company-owned trucks. We inferred that
the cost of operating these company-owned trucks were probably high based on their
ambiguous answers when we asked about the cost structure.
Takeaway: Organic food requires freshness, which means either physical adjacency
or high delivery cost. This can be a challenge to startups who are not deeply funded.
June 8 - Supplier: HaSi Organic Farm 哈斯农场

Through some friends, we discovered that there was an organic producer door-to-door
delivery service, HaSi Organic Farm 哈斯农场, growing on the popular WeChat
platform. While initially we thought that they were only distributors/marketers of
organic produce sourced elsewhere, they turned out to be owning and operating the
entire supply chain from research, farming, packaging to delivery. We were pretty
amazed by that despite their relatively small scale with annual revenue of about 10
million RMB.

We paid a visit to the actual farm located about an hour outside of Beijing.
Fortunately, we were able to secure a tour of the farm and had the Vice President of
the farm explaining to us the details of how they operated the farm. According to her,
they have been in the business for a long time starting out in Inner Mongolia where
she and her husband (the President of the farm) ran an organic farm. They expanded
to Beijing seeing a potential market here. In Beijing, their business targeted
upper-middle income customers who placed an emphasis on healthier living and have
been operating for about three years now. They grew at steady pace and expanded
themselves based on living communities (小区). They had to make sure that there was
critical mass of customers before committing to providing door-to-door services for a
living community because the cost structure simply did not make sense for a small,
sparse group of customers. It was also costly and difficult to scale quickly given their
limitation in production and handling massive fast distribution logistics given that
organic produce seem to be very perishable. They need arable land that is certified to
be capable of producing organic food before they can legally append the ‘Certified To
Be Organic’ tag on their produce - such land availability is limited in and around
Beijing where heavy chemical industrials take place.
June 9 - Tsinghua University 清华大学 - speaking with graduate student researching
topics related to food safety
We visited Tsinghua University’s library and spent some time reading through
organic agriculture materials. Organic agriculture seemed to be a relatively new topic
in agricultural studies in China based on the limited availability of academic resources
in the library. Most of the research were focused on food safety - which has been a hot
topic in China in the past decade. It occurred to us that people, at least the ones in the
academic/research community, were more concerned with eating safe as opposed to
eating healthy. It seemed natural that only when food safety is guaranteed can people
start to focus on food quality.
After lunch, we met up with a Canadian grad student to talk about his research into
organic certification. He was trying to build a startup in China that provides organic
certification as a service (OCaaS) because he knew that in China, organic producers
have a really hard time trying to get themselves certified. While his startup will
possibly address the problem, he mentioned that it has been really hard to organic
produce (whether offline or online) commerce to take off because of the tedious
process of certification and the risk of denial. Few companies, regardless of where
they are in the supply chain, are willing to invest in this complex and risky process
which has not proven to be very profitable in the short run.
Takeaway: The interview with the Tsinghua University graduate student shows both
challenges and opportunities. The challenge is that the certification process is lengthy
and too costly to be justified in the short run for many companies. Therefore, the

incentive to shift to organic production will be tampered. The opportunities come
from the same direction. Traceability is key to food safety and standardization of
organic food production practices. There is intrinsic business value.
June 10 - China Federation of Organic Agriculture Movement (CFOAM) 中国有机
产业发展联盟

We got in touch with CFOAM through a business card contact. CFOAM is a
non-profit organization in China (mostly in and around Beijing) helping to drive
commerce in the organic produce market in China. We were invited their inaugural
Organic Produce & E-Commerce session to find out more about how they support
online businesses that try to get into the business of selling organic produce directly to
consumers. We saw 20-30 participants at the session and most of them were organic
producers who are trying to get online - what this meant was that many of those
interested in the organic ecommerce business were all starting with an existing offline
business or supply. The problems that they raised at the sessions were issues like
access to certification authorities and most importantly how to integrate their offline
business with an online presence and the use of software to enable this process. Also,
many were worried about the logistics involved in fresh produce that may not make
sense for the scale of their local businesses.
June 13 - Chat with Gang Yu about organic food delivery at Wharton Global Forum
Beijing and dinner with professionals working in agricultural investments and trading

We had the opportunity to network with Gang Yu, CEO/Founder of Yihaodian (where
Walmart China is a majority owner) because we knew that Yihaodian also has a
online department that sells fresh produce locally in Shanghai and Beijing. We had
him for about 15 min over coffee break when we were able to ask him about his
opinion on the business model of selling organic fresh produce door-to-door to
customers. The first thing he said is “how much money are you ready to burn?”. It
became apparent that the burn rate for selling organic fresh produce on his
ecommerce site is a lot larger than his other merchandise. We inferred that it was
somewhat easier for him to reach customers given his already successful customer
base in the non-perishable products. He only introduced the fresh produce department
to Yihaodian after rolling it out in small scale and evaluating business feasibility. He
sees that this market will definitely grow over the next few decades in China but
whether the belongs to large market players or startups is a tough question though he
inclines to believe that the former will have a much easier time.
Later in the night, we had dinner with two agriculture professionals - one of them
works at New Hope Private Equity 新希望私募基金 while the other works in
agriculture futures trading. The buy-side story in this area seems to be that they
typically invested much higher up in the supply chain. For instance, they invested in
quality agricultural chemicals, automated agricultural equipments, and startups
focusing better enabling logistics using information technology. They expected
producers to be natural players in the distribution/marketing process of the supply
chain in the future.
Shanghai
June 15 - DuoLi Organic Farm 多利有机农庄

We discovered there is only one company in China that sells fresh organic produce
door-to-door on a regional scale (every others were mostly conducting business
locally). This company is called DuoLi Farm 多利农庄. We were lucky to have been
introduced to the General Manager of the farm through our attendance at the CFOAM
session. They are 100% vertically integrated in the supply chain as they believe they
can gain economies of scale if they can grow volume fast. They have been growing
relatively quickly in the last five years - mostly in the higher portions of the supply
chain by procuring arable land from local governments to prepare the land for
growing organic agriculture. Apparently, the lands they procure need at least three
years to be ready for organic growth. It seemed clear to us that the way they have
been growing result in an extremely high cash burn rate. The GM told us that the
founder has nationally-acclaimed credentials in agricultural research and has been
backed by the government with venture funds on the order of the billions to expand
quickly and develop a market for organic agriculture. When asked about profits, the
GM declined to comment but said they are still growing and focusing on investments.

